This paper o¤ers an explanation for the existence of wholesalers and other intermediaries in international trade, and analyses their e¤ect in an economy with heterogeneous manufacturing …rms. Exporting …rms have to pay a …xed cost of establishing a distribution network in a foreign market. However, wholesalers possess a technology di¤erent to normal manufacturing …rms: they can buy manufacturing goods domestically and sell in foreign markets, and they can handle more than one good. A wholesaler therefore faces an additional …xed cost which is convex and monotonically increasing in the number of goods it handles. The entry of wholesale …rms leads to productivity sorting. The most productive …rms export on their own by paying a …xed cost, but a range of …rms with intermediate productivity levels export through international wholesalers. A higher …xed cost of exporting leads to (i) a higher share of the total value of exports and (ii) a higher share of exported product scope that is distributed by wholesalers. A higher …xed cost of exporting gives wholesalers a larger role, since these can spread the …xed cost across more than one good. The wholesale technology therefore exhibits economies of scope. Finally, a gravity model is developed where the 'multilateral resistance variable'is found to include the number of wholesalers of trading partners. Their presence lowers a country's price index, as well as mitigates the positive e¤ect that …xed trade costs have on price levels. An empirical analysis using Swedish …rm-level data supports the main assumption and predictions of the model. JEL Classi…cation: D21, F12, F15
Introduction
Consumers in modern economies buy few, if any, products directly from the original producer. Instead, a vast majority of goods are, to some extent, intermediated by retailers, wholesalers, international trading companies and other intermediaries. This phenomenon is likely even more important for internationally traded goods. Recent empirical research shows that intermediation is important also for how producers of goods enter foreign markets. For example, Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2010) report that around 35% of imports into Chile are handled by wholesalers. Basker and Van (2008) document the role of WalMart as a catalyst for US imports from China and note that this large US retailer accounts for 15% of US imports from China. Feenstra and Hanson (2004) examine the role of Hong Kong in re-exporting goods from China during the period 1988-1998 and …nd that 53% of Chinese exports were shipped through Hong Kong as re-exports. The authors argue that intermediation was one of the more important factors for this. These ratios are even larger for some goods typically associated with China's rapid export growth in the 1990s, such as 77% for footwear and 83% for toys. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) …nd that exporting …rms in the US exhibit substantial heterogeneity as regards export mode, i.e. whether …rms manage their own exporting activities or export through intermediaries. Consequently, the common assumption in the literature on international trade-that …rms are always responsible for their own exporting activities-does not provide a full picture of how …rms enter foreign markets and why.
1 However, a growing theoretical literature is currently exploring the issue of intermediation in international trade. So far, this has mainly focused on the role of intermediaries in reducing contracting or matching frictions between buyers and sellers, as in Antràs and Costinot (2010a, b) , Biglaiser (1993) , Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009) or Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) ; or on their positions in networks in international trade, as in Rauch (1999 Rauch ( , 2001 ), Rauch and Watson (2004) or Petropoulou (2007) .
2 This paper tells a rather di¤erent story about why intermediaries exist in international trade. The basic notion is that intermediaries assist producing …rms in overcoming destination-speci…c barriers of entry. Here, intermediaries are wholesalers that are able to pool the …xed cost of exporting across more than one good.
3 I utilise a standard model of international trade with …rm heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003) , and introduce a sector 1 For further empirical evidence, see also Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2010) , Basker and Van (2010) , Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi (2010) and Rauch and Trindade (2002) .
2 Ra¤ and Schmitt (2006 , 2009 ) study issues relating to strategic interaction between wholesalers, retailers and producers. 3 The term wholesalers will be used in the paper since the empirical analysis uses data for wholesale …rms, but the theoretical model could just as well be applied to intermediaries in general.
of wholesalers. These do not produce goods themselves. Instead, they buy goods in their local market and export these goods to foreign markets. They only have to incur the …xed cost of establishing a distribution network in a foreign market once (regardless of how many goods they export). However, they face a …xed cost of their distribution network, which is convex and increasing in product scope (the range of goods that a wholesaler exports). For a producer, exporting through a wholesaler is therefore an alternative to setting up its own distribution channel. The main focus of the paper is on how aggregate trade ‡ows and heterogeneous producers of goods respond to the possibility of exporting through wholesalers, as an alternative to managing their own distribution networks, and therefore wholesalers are assumed to be homogeneous.
The paper de…nes the general equilibrium of a model with wholesalers, which is characterised by free entry in all sectors. This generates a number of predictions about how exporting is conducted in the presence of intermediation. First, producers sort according to productivity in determining their mode of exporting. The most productive …rms continue to manage their own exporting activities and incur the …xed cost associated with this as in the standard model. However, some …rms that were almost productive enough to export on their own in a standard model now choose to do so, but through wholesalers instead. The least productive …rms do not export through any of the two modes. 4 Second, the size of the …xed cost of foreign market entry a¤ects the choice of export mode. A higher …xed cost is associated with a larger importance of wholesalers: a larger share of aggregate exports is now intermediated rather than exported directly by the producing …rms. Moreover, a larger number of …rms choose to export through wholesalers rather than managing their own distribution systems when …xed costs of exporting are high. Finally, a larger …xed cost is associated with each wholesaler handling more goods (having a larger scope).
The core mechanism at work in the model is the following: Wholesalers manage to spread the …xed cost of exporting across more than one good. But, to cover the …xed cost, they need to charge a markup between the procurement price of the good and what it charges the …nal consumer in the foreign country. This markup that wholesalers charge causes productivity sorting in the choice of export mode: the most productive …rms choose to incur their own …xed cost of exporting since their operating pro…t is large enough. However, some goods, which cannot be pro…tably exported by the producer itself, can be exported at a lower …xed cost (per good) by wholesalers, who export several goods but only have to make one investment in the …xed cost. This means that the wholesale technology exhibits economies of scope. When …xed costs increase, wholesalers become more important, since fewer …rms can export on their own. Moreover, wholesalers have to expand and handle more goods to be able to cover the larger …xed cost. Wholesalers therefore help producers in overcoming destination-speci…c barriers to entry.
To reach the above conclusions, I have assumed free entry of manufacturing …rms in order to restrict the model as little as possible. In the …nal theoretical section, however, I drop the free entry assumption and develop a multicountry gravity model under the assumptions in Chaney (2008) which does not allow for free entry in the manufacturing sector. The 'multilateral resistance variable' is found to include the number of wholesalers of trading partners, and their presence lowers a country's price index as well as mitigates the positive e¤ect that …xed trade costs have on the price level. Since the price level is indirectly a measure of welfare, wholesalers therefore contribute positively to welfare.
Swedish data is used to test the main assumption and predictions of the model. In this context, Sweden represents a small and highly open economy for which merchandise trade amounted to 63% of GDP in 2005 according to the World Bank, which can be compared to 21% for the United States in the same year. Speci…cally, I use Swedish …rm-level data from 2005, which matches data from the Swedish customs o¢ ce with production data on Swedish …rms. The data structure enables a sector classi…cation of …rms according to main business activity, and also contains their trade ‡ows by HS8 product code and destination. It can therefore be observed what goods are exported by …rms listed as either 'wholesalers' or 'manufacturers' where the latter are treated as the producers of goods. The analysis supports the main assumption and the predictions of the model. Crucially, for the basic assumption about economies of scope, Swedish wholesalers export a larger scope of products (or HS8 product categories) than producers. A wholesaler exports about 54% more products per …rm when destination-speci…c e¤ects and …rm size are accounted for, an empirical fact which supports the notion that there is a technological di¤erence between wholesalers and producers. Moreover, wholesalers export, on average, substantially less in value (between 35 and 57% less) per …rm within a product category than producers. Finally, wholesalers play a more important role in aggregate exports (both in terms of total value and in the number of HS8 product categories exported) from Sweden to countries characterised by larger …xed costs. Admittedly, no perfect measure of …xed costs exists so these are proxied by institutional variables, such as the di¢ culty to import, or the inverse of the residual from a gravity equation.
Two other papers in the literature also focus on the interaction between …xed costs and export mode in a setting of heterogeneous manufacturing …rms, as in Melitz (2003) . Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2010) assume that …xed costs are lower for producers if they export by using an intermediary than on their own but that they, in this case, have to pay an additional variable cost. Producers can pay one …xed cost to get access to all foreign markets through intermediaries, or they can pay a per-market …xed cost of direct exporting to enter certain markets without using an intermediary. The main di¤erence to my paper is that I model the technology of intermediaries explicitly. This makes it possible to analyse a general equilibrium with free entry of …rms in all sectors, and to use endogenous price levels, which is important in models building on monopolistic competition. Unlike in my model, Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2010) predict a negative e¤ect of the population size of a destination on the importance of intermediaries, which is supported by empirical evidence both in my and their empirical analysis. The dynamic behind their result comes from the assumption of exogenous price levels and that one …xed cost of intermediation gives access to all foreign markets, while direct exporting requires investing in per-market …xed costs. When the price level is …xed, an increase in the size of a destination generates a higher demand per …rm which makes more producers productive enough to pay the …xed cost of direct exporting to that market and avoid the markup charged by intermediaries. In my model, however, all variables change endogenously. Moreover, changes in market size a¤ect both intermediaries and producers in the same way, and therefore the choice of export mode does not change with a change in demand. Finally, they apply Chinese …rm-level data to test their implications and use certain Chinese characters in the names of …rms to identify intermediaries. Their empirical results are similar to those in my paper except that they …nd that intermediaries are fairly large compared to manufacturing …rms, as measured by export volumes, destinations and product scope per …rm, while I …nd intermediaries to be substantially smaller. 5 Felbermayr and Jung (2009) also model intermediaries, but the driver here is not economies of scope, but rather a hold-up problem due to contracting frictions as in Antràs and Helpman (2004) . This leads to a bargaining process over the pro…ts between the intermediary and the producer. This setup causes the most productive …rms to export on their own to avoid sharing their pro…ts with the intermediary and their model therefore generates productivity sorting. They do not, however, model intermediaries explicitly. Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009) explore the role played by intermediaries in alleviating matching frictions between buyers and sellers in spatially segmented markets and the matching patterns be-tween exporters and importers. Finally, Tang and Zhang (2011) explore the e¤ect of trade intermediation in a setting with quality di¤erentiation. 6 Importantly, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) …nd evidence for 'mixed' …rms (plants that engage in both manufacturing and wholesale activities). The authors have information on the main business activity of each plant and among these categories are 'wholesale'and 'retail'. Firms which consist of plants engaging in both production and wholesale (or retail) are labelled as 'mixed' (this means that they have at least one plant which engages in wholesale and one plant which does not). Firms in this category are found to be larger, both in terms of turnover and number of employees, but also in terms of export and import volumes. Two points are important to make here since my model is more strict in the sense that it models …rms which only engage in either production or wholesale.
First, the phenomenon of 'mixed'…rms is to some extent a feature of how microdata is structured by statistical authorities, and the fact that larger …rms are more likely to divide their businesses formally into di¤erent plants. All manufacturing …rms engage in logistics of some kind. But a small …rm with ten employees will not register its logistics unit as a plant in itself (it might be that only one employee handles all of the …rm's shipping, for example) since this activity is simply too small in size to constitute a plant or establishment. A large …rm with several hundreds of employees, however, will probably employ a larger number of people working only with logistics and is more likely to have this activity in a separate building, perhaps even in an own subsidiary company if the parent …rm is large enough. In the latter case, the …rm will be 'mixed'since it has separate plants running both production and shipping. But, ultimately, the di¤erence is driven by size and we know that larger …rms also tend to engage in more exporting and importing. This phenomenon is reinforced since a 'mixed' …rm, by de…nition, has to consist of more than one plant and multiplant …rms are typically larger and more active in foreign trade than single plant …rms. Second, if it is a widespread phenomenon that large …rms indeed run their own wholesale distribution system and bene…t from the same technology as wholesalers, the empirical results would not support the predictions I …nd. Finally, it is possible to see the model that I propose in this paper as one that analyses the extreme cases of 'pure'wholesalers and producers in order to highlight the e¤ect of economies of scope in the wholesale technology.
Section 2 develops the model by introducing a wholesale industry into the model in Melitz (2003) and derives the main results. These predictions are also incorporated into a general gravity model with …rm heterogeneity, as in Chaney (2008) , to …nd the e¤ect of wholesalers on welfare. Section 3 describes the Swedish data and provides the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
The basic model builds on the structure in Melitz (2003) but with an additional 'agricultural' sector characterised by constant returns to scale.
Basics
The model depicts two economies ('Home'and 'Foreign', the latter denoted by superscipt 'F ') with a primary production factor labour, L, which is used in all sectors. Ignoring the wholesale sector for the moment, there are two main sectors in the economy. First, the agricultural sector is a Walrasian, homogeneous-good sector with costless trade. Second, the manufacturing sector is characterized by increasing returns, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. Manufacturers face constant marginal production costs and three types of …xed costs. The …xed cost, F E , is the standard Dixit-Stiglitz cost of developing a new variety. The other two …xed costs involved re ‡ect the one-time expense of introducing a new variety into a market: F D if it is the domestic market and F X for the foreign market.
There is heterogeneity with respect to …rms'productivity levels, '. Each Dixit-Stiglitz …rm/variety is therefore associated with a particular labour output coe¢ cient denoted by ' i for …rm i. After sinking F E units of labour in the product innovation process, the …rm is randomly assigned ' i from the cumulative distribution function G (').
The analysis exclusively focuses on steady-state equilibria and intertemporal considerations are ignored; the present value of …rms is kept …nite by assuming that …rms face a constant Poisson hazard rate of forced exit.
Consumers in each country have two-tier utility functions with the upper tier (CobbDouglas) determining the consumer's division of expenditure among the sectors and the second tier (CES) dictating the consumer's preferences over the various di¤erentiated varieties within the manufacturing sector.
All individuals in Home have the utility function
where 2 (0; 1), and C A is the consumption of the homogeneous good. Manufactures enter the utility function through the index C M , de…ned by
where N is the mass of varieties consumed, c i the amount of variety i consumed and > 1 the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Each consumer spends a share of his income on manufactures, and demand for a variety i is therefore
where
p i is the consumer price of variety i, L is the population size and
the price index of manufacturing goods available in the Home country. The set of available varieties is denoted by . The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour. This good is freely traded and since it is chosen as the numeraire
where w is the nominal wage of workers.
In an economy without wholesalers, shipping the manufactured good involves a frictional trade cost of the 'iceberg'form: for one unit of a good from Home to arrive in the Foreign country, > 1 units must be shipped. It is assumed that trade costs are equal in both directions. Pro…t maximisation by a manufacturing …rm i located in Home exporting to the Foreign country leads to the following consumer price in Foreign of …rm i's good:
Entrepreneurs entering the manufacturing sector draw their marginal productivity, ', from the probability distribution G(') after having sunk F E units of labour to develop a new variety. Having learned their productivity, …rms decide on entry in the domestic and foreign market, respectively. Doing so is associated with …xed market entry costs; …rms pay F D to enter the domestic market and F X to enter the foreign market. Firms will therefore enter a market as long as the operating pro…t in this market is su¢ ciently large to cover market entry cost associated with the market. Because of the constant mark-up pricing, it is easily shown that operating pro…ts equal revenues divided by . The critical cut-o¤ levels of productivity needed in order to enter the domestic and foreign markets (for the operating pro…t to be as large as the discounted …xed cost of entry) are given by:
demand"of the Home market and the Foreign market, respectively. Accounting also for free entry, which means that E ( ) = F E , yields that A = A F . The reason for using the notation ' 0 X is that the export cut-o¤ will be di¤erent when wholesalers are introduced. Equations (7) and (8) yield the standard result from Melitz (2003) which can be summarised as follows (provided that
Proposition 1 In a world without wholesalers, only …rms with a marginal productivity above ' 0 X choose to export, …rms with a productivity between ' D and ' 0 X serve the domestic market and …rms with a marginal productivity below ' D exit immediately.
Introducing wholesalers
The third sector, which is the novel feature of the model, is the wholesale sector (variables relating to this sector are denoted by superscript "W "). Wholesale …rms are indexed by j and are homogeneous. The wholesale technology gives a wholesaler …rm j the ability to source a range of goods and ship these to the Foreign country. The mass of goods each wholesaler ships (equal to the mass of manufacturing …rms the wholesaler is buying goods from) is denoted by m W j . The sector is caracterised by free entry. A wholesaler faces the same cost as manufacturing …rms to establish a retail channel in the foreign country, F X , but has the technology to export several goods. Operations are assumed to become more costly the more goods a …rm handles, so it also faces a per-period …xed cost that is monotonically and convexly increasing in the range of goods it handles. Its total …xed cost of foreign market entry is therefore:
where > 1 and m W j is the mass of domestic manufacturing goods the wholesale …rm j is handling. Since manufacturing …rms are atomistic and therefore has a mass equal to zero, if a wholesale …rm were to only export one single good, its scope measure m W j would be zero and lim m W j !0 F W Xj = F X . Therefore, a wholesale …rm which only exports one good has the same …xed cost of exporting as a manufacturer. Moreover, the functional form in (9) is chosen both for technical and intuitive reasons. The technical reason is that some convexity needs to be included in this function to put an upper bound on the scope of wholesalers. If it was not present (i.e. if = 0), the economies of scope would be in…nite and only one wholesaler would exist and would export all goods. The intuitive reason is that it is more costly to maintain an international distribution system the more di¤erent goods are in nature. If m W j is low, the wholesaler is more specialised in a more narrow range of products, for example sport cars of di¤erent kinds. However, as m W j increases, the products necessarily become more di¤erent; in the speci…c example the whole …rm also starts to export other types of cars and other types of motor vehicles etc., and the level of specialisation decreases and the cost per product increases. The wider the scope, the more costly each product is to export.
I assume that a wholesaler gets the exclusive right to sell the manufacturing good in the foreign market (thereby excluding the possibility that more than one wholesaler sell the same manufacturing good). Since the wholesaler faces a CES demand abroad, its demand function towards manufacturing …rms when procuring their products is also characterised by a CES structure. This causes manufacturing …rms to charge the same price to wholesalers as they do to consumers. And since the manufacturer imposes a CES markup over its marginal cost and the wholesaler does the same, the …nal consumer price in the foreign economy for a good sold by a wholesaler is characterised by a "double marginalisation"; the CES markup of 1 is imposed twice.
where p W ij is the price charged by wholesaler j selling manufacturing …rm i's good in the foreign market.
Proposition 2 A wholesaler imposes a double marginalisation over the initial marginal cost of the producer.
Proof. The marginal cost of wholesaler j consists of two parts. First, it pays an iceberg trade cost, , and, second, it pays the procurement price of the domestic manufacturing good (from manufacturer i). Since a monopolistically competitive manufacturer does not neccessarily charge the same price to …nal consumers and wholesaler …rms, the price manufacturer i charges wholesaler j is for now denoted by p ij;P . The wholesaler's marginal cost, M C W ij of procuring manufacturer i's good is then equal to
The wholesaler faces the demand
in the foreign economy where p W ij is the price that wholesale …rm j charges for manufacturing …rm i's good in Foreign. Faced with a CES type of demand, it will charge a constant markup over its marginal cost:
The demand for good i sold by wholesaler j in Foreign, x ij , will be equal to A F 1 p ij;P and wholesaler j's cost function is therefore:
Applying Shephard's lemma to …nd wholesaler j's demand function for good i (i.e. the demand function that manufacturer i faces from wholesaler j), yields:
This result has two important implications. First, the producer …rm faces the exact same demand elasticity from wholesale …rms as that from domestic consumers, and will therefore charge the same price to wholesalers as it does to domestic consumers (a constant markup over its marginal cost), p ij;P = p i . Second, it can be seen that the wholesaler will charge the following price in the foreign economy (foreign consumers have CES demand and the wholesaler will charge a standard CES markup over its marginal cost):
The term 1 2 decreases in the elasticity of substitution which means that the degree of double marginalisation is smaller in sectors where varieties are more substitutable.
Proposition 3 The double marginalisation is higher in less competitive sectors, i.e. in sectors characterised by low elasticities of substitution.
Proof. See proof to Proposition 2.
Since manufacturers can choose their export mode (i.e. by establishing their own distribution system or exporting through a wholesaler), their choices are determined by what mode yields the highest pro…ts from exporting. The expected operating pro…ts (discounted by the forced exit rate ) of a manufacturing …rm i that exports through wholesaler j will be
indicates foreign sales of good i at price p W ij , i.e. the price set by the wholesaler. The expected discounted operating pro…ts of a manufacturing …rm exporting on its own would be
Comparing the pro…ts for a manufacturing …rm choosing between the two export modes yields the following condition, using (12) and (13), for the …rm to choose to export on its own:
This means that more productive …rms will want to export on their own rather than through a wholesaler. This is due to the fact that they are productive enough to take the …xed cost of exporting themselves and avoid the markup incurred on them by the wholesaler. Note also that (14) de…nes the new export cut-o¤
The inequality sign demonstrates that, with wholesalers present, some producers that previously exported on their own now decide to use wholesalers instead. Therefore the export cut-o¤ is higher with wholesalers in the model than without. This phenomenon is illustrated in …gure 1. The lines X and W show the operating pro…ts of manufacturing …rm exporting on its own and exporting through a wholesaler, respectively, as functions of their productivity levels. The line W starts from zero since a manufacturing …rm does not have to pay any …xed costs when exporting through a wholesaler. However, exporting directly requires paying a …xed cost F X . The slope of W is lower than that of X due to the additional markup charged by the wholesaler. A manufacturer with productivity higher than ' X will always have higher operating pro…ts from exporting on its own ( X > W 8 ' > ' X ).
Supposing that wholesalers only …nd it pro…table to buy goods with a productivity higher than ' W means that …rms with productivity levels between ' W and ' X will prefer to export through a wholesaler rather than on their own. Also, the export cut-o¤ in an economy without wholesalers, ' 0 X , will always lie to the left of ' X , which can be seen in the graph. Note also that since wholesaler prices are higher, they also export smaller volumes per good. The reason that their prices are higher is due to (i) their additional markup and (ii) the fact that they export goods produced by less productive …rms.
Finally, equation (14) shows that the degree of competition (the elasticity of substitution across varieties) in a sector a¤ects the productivity cuto¤ for direct exporting since it determines the impact of the double marginalisation imposed by wholesalers. Less competition (i.e. a smaller ) means that the cuto¤ for direct exporting is lower since the wholesaler's additional margin is higher which makes it relatively more expensive to use.
Proposition 4
The model generates productivity sorting as regards choice of export mode. The most productive …rms, ' > ' X , export their products on their own, …rms with intermediate productivity levels, ' 2 [' W ; ' X ), export through wholesalers and the least productive …rms, ' 2 [' D ; ' W ), do not export. That ' D < ' W has, however, to be assumed.
Proposition 5 Export sales per good are lower for wholesalers than for producers exporting on their own. Proposition 6 Sectors characterised by less competition (low elasticity of substitution) have a lower export cuto¤ due to the stronger e¤ ect of the double marginalisation imposed by wholesalers.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Figure 1: Relative pro…ts for di¤erent export modes. X indicates the operating pro…t of a producer which exports on its own and W indicates the operating pro…t of a producer exporting through a wholesaler.
Wholesale …rms are homogeneous and I assume that the atomistic manufacturing …rms that use wholesalers for the distribution of their goods are randomly matched with wholesaler …rms (see …gure 2). This ensures that wholesaler …rms in equilibrium will, on average, have identical baskets of goods that they export. They will therefore have the same number of products and also the same distribution of productivity among the goods in their baskets. 7 The scope of goods that wholesaler …rms then handle will be equal to the mass of manufacturing …rms that use wholesalers for exporting (i.e. those with a level of productivity between ' W and ' X ). The mass of manufacturers in this range is M
where M M is the mass of manufacturing …rms in total. The scope per wholesaler is then equal to this expression divided by the number of wholesale …rms, n W :
The total …xed cost of a wholesaler, as speci…ed in equation (9) can therefore be written:
where ' W is the marginal productivity of the least productive manufacturing …rm that exports through wholesalers. A wholesaler takes as given the number of other wholesale …rms and the mass of domestic manufacturing …rms and its pricing mechanism is, as described in equation (10): a constant markup over the marginal cost. Therefore the number of wholesale …rms and the range of goods they consume can be determined by two conditions. First, the free entry condition states that the pro…ts of wholesale …rms should be zero. Second, an optimal scope condition by wholesalers, i.e. that the marginal increase in operating pro…ts for a wholesaler …rm to expand its set of goods distributed (its scope) must equal the resulting marginal increase in …xed costs, speci…es the scope of each wholesale …rm.
7 Wholesalers control more than one good and are therefore no longer atomistic like the manufacturing …rms. This could potentially have implications for how they a¤ect prices, but it is assumed here that parameters are such that these baskets of atomistic products are still small enough not to have an e¤ect on the aggregate price level. In a sense, a wholesaler could be labelled 'moleculistic', i.e. larger than an 'atomistic' …rm but still small enough not to have an e¤ect on the aggregate price level. In this context, it can also be noted that in the seminal contributions by, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 , the distribution of di¤erentiated varities are discrete and not continuous such as in the more recent trade literature. With a discrete and …nite set of varieties, all manufacturing …rms are theoretically able to a¤ect the aggregate price index so it has to be assumed that they do not. 
These two conditions jointly determine the mass of manufacturing …rms exporting through each wholesaler, m W j , and the weighted average of operating pro…t per good handled
The …xed cost of exporting, F X , is the key variable in understanding how the size of wholesaler …rms is determined. A larger …xed cost of exporting forces wholesale …rms to expand their scope so that the …xed cost is spread across more goods. It also makes the operating pro…t per good handled to be larger in equilibrium. The parameter determining how di¢ cult it is for wholesalers to handle more goods, , also plays an important role. The elasticity of the optimal scope with respect to the …xed cost in equation (19) is 1 which decreases in ; the more di¢ cult it is to handle many goods, the less responsive is the scope of wholesalers to …xed costs.
Proposition 7
The optimal scope of wholesalers increases in the size of the …xed cost of exporting.
Proposition 8 The elasticity of the optimal scope of wholesalers with respect to the …xed cost of exporting is lower when it is more di¢ cult for wholesalers to exand their scope (when is high).
To close the equilibrium, I note that the operating pro…t of wholesaler j selling good i is:
Therefore, the total operating pro…t of wholesale …rm j is
where e W j (' W ; ' X ) is the average operating pro…t per good handled given the range of productivity in the basket.
Combining (20), and (21) gives:
where ' W is the equilibrium level of the lowest productivity needed for a manufacturing …rm to use a wholesaler …rm to export. 8 The export cut-o¤, ' X , is determined according to (8) by , F X and A F . The variable and …xed trade costs are exogenous but A F is endogenous.
Since the left side of (22) is monotonically increasing in ' W , equation (22) yields an implicit solution for ' W as a function of A F .
Using the equilibrium value for ' W , it is also possible to …nd a solution for the number of wholesale …rms by combining (15) and (19):
Finally, the free entry condition for manufacturing …rms says that, in expectation, the expected total pro…t of entrepreneur must equal the …xed entry cost:
The set of equations (4), (7), (14), (22), (23) and (24) yield implicit solutions for the productivity cut-o¤s ' D , ' W , ' X and the mass of wholesale and manufacturing …rms, n W ,
The 'per-…rm demand' A in Home and A F in Foreign are determined by the mass of …rms, number of wholesalers together with the productivity cuto¤ levels through the expression for the price levels. This set of equations therefore de…nes a general equilibrium in the sense that there is free entry in all sectors, and that price levels and market demand are endogenous.
Imposing the Pareto distribution
To …nd exact expressions for the importance of wholesalers in the economy, the exact distribution of productivity, G (') has to be speci…ed. I therefore impose the scale-free Pareto distribution. which has been found to correspond reasonably well with observed distributions of …rm productivity, see Axtell (2001) or Luttmer (2007) . Now
where ' 2 [1; 1). For solutions to exist it is also required that k 1 > 1. To calculate the relative export volumes that occur by …rms exporting on their own versus through wholesalers, it can be noted that the export volume of a good through the two export modes is:
The ratio of total export volumes will therefore be
which is an explicit function of the relative productivity cut-o¤ levels ' X and ' W . The relative mass of …rms exporting on their own versus through wholesalers can be written
which is also an explicit function of the relative productivity cut-o¤s. To see what a¤ects the relative importance of wholesalers in both total value, equation (27), and scope, equation (28), it is necessary to understand what a¤ects the relative productivity cut-o¤,
. An explicit solution for ' W cannot be found but by evaluating equation (22), the following nonlinear relationship can be found:
where 1 is a constant of parameters. 9 The expression shows that the relative productivity cut-o¤ increases in the …xed cost of exporting. First, a higher …xed cost causes the relative productivity cut-o¤ to increase. This, therefore, causes: (i) more …rms to export through wholesalers (which is equivalent to more varieties or products being exported through wholesalers) and (ii) the relative export volume that is managed by wholesalers to increase. This result originates in the central dynamic provided by the model: the wholesale industry pools the export …xed costs across goods and therefore reduces the …xed cost per good, a feature which is more important when …xed costs are large. We saw previously that a higher …xed cost causes wholesale …rms to expand the set of goods that they handle. By doing so, the …xed cost per good decreases. Second, neither the variable trade cost, , or per …rm demand, A F , play any role for the choice of export mode. This is due to the fact that for the operating pro…t, these variables a¤ect wholesalers and direct exporters in identical ways. 10 The wholesale technology therefore exhibits an increasing returns to scale property with regard to product scope. An increase in the product scope lowers the …xed cost per good, making wholesalers more important as …xed costs increase. The net e¤ect of the elasticity of substitution, however, is unclear. As we saw in Proposition 6, more competition (higher ) causes …rms at the margin between choosing direct or wholesale exporting to opt for exporting through wholesalers. This should make increase the role played by wholesalers. However, a higher also makes price di¤erences more impor-
1 0 Distance appears to signi…cantly a¤ect the importance of intermediaries in activities relating to foreign trade in many empirical studies. Indeed, the empirical analysis in this paper shows that wholesalers are more important in distant markets. While contrary to the results of this paper, a range of explanations can be argued to give this pattern. An obvious one is that the …xed cost of entering a foreign market increases with distance, since cultural barriers, supervision costs etc. are larger in markets far away than in those close to the home country of a …rm. This would be in line with the theoretical predictions presented here.
Market size per …rm, A F , should not be confused with country size, L. In all theoretical models with a homogenous sector and free entry in the di¤erentiated sector, e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) , the market size per …rm, A = L P 1 , is in fact the same across countries regardless of population size (since the price level is lower in larger economies). Regardless of assumptions, the entry of …rms (which lowers prices) always counterbalances an increase in country size and the net e¤ect depends on assumptions.
tant for revenues and pro…tability. When the elasticity of substitution is high, the additional markup imposed by wholesalers becomes more important for how much is actually sold and this has a negative e¤ect on the aggregate role played by wholesalers in exporting.
The conclusions above can be summarised in the following two propositions.
Proposition 9 A higher …xed cost is associated with (i) a higher share of total exports being shipped by wholesalers and (ii) a larger number of …rms exporting through wholesalers relative to exporting on their own. This is due to the fact that wholesalers spread the …xed cost of exporting across more goods.
Proof. The following is a proof that
First, the condition for the derivative to be positive can be simpli…ed to
Now, consider the factors of the …rst term.
= 1, the expression on the left hand side is equal to 0. However, as
increase, meaning that the whole expression on the left hand side will increase. Therefore, the condition holds since ' X ' W has to be strictly greater than 1.
Proposition 10
The net e¤ ect of the elasticity of substitution on the aggregate importance of wholesalers in exporting is unclear.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Finally, if this model was expanded to a multicountry setting, the ratio of the productivity cut-o¤s,
, to each export destination J would depend on country J's …xed cost of entry. Since such costs di¤er across countries, many manufacturing …rms would export directly to some countries but through a wholesaler to other countries. In this case, the equilibrium would contain …rms that use both export modes at the same time but not, however, both export modes to the same country. This is the focus of the following section.
Gravity and Welfare
The model outlined above gives predictions for when wholesale …rms are important for aggregate trade ‡ows (both in terms of value of export ‡ows but also in terms of product scope). It also gives predictions for what …rms select into which of the two export modes available. The advantage with the setup used so far is that it assumes free entry in both the manufacturing and wholesale industries and therefore generates a general equilibrium model. However, in this section, I make an important modi…cation of the assumptions for two reasons. First, I wish to attain analytically solvable expressions for welfare, which in this model is measured by the price index. Second, I want to compare my model to a version of the model by Melitz (2003) that has become relatively standard in the literature, namely that of Chaney (2008) . He estimates the e¤ect of …rm heterogeneity on the gravity model and modi…es the 'multilateral resistance'variable proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) .
This section therefore imposes the same assumptions for the manufacturing sector as Chaney (2008) . Most importantly, free entry in the manufacturing sector, as in (24), is restricted.
11 Instead, there is a constant number of 'potential entrants'in country i, M M i , which is proportional to the size of that economy:
This means that the expected pro…t of …rms is no longer zero. Instead, pro…ts are collected into a global fund in which workers own shares according to their income. For comparability, I also assume that the productivity in the homogenous (agricultural) sector di¤ers across countries which generates wage di¤erences across countries. I denote the wage level in country i by w i . The dividend per share in the global fund is equal to and is the same across countries. Therefore, the output level in country i is equal to
1 1 The reason for not choosing this restriction of entry already from the start is that the model generates all the results until this point while allowing for free entry which is the most preferable setup for a general equilibrium model.
The dividend, , can therefore be written denotes the number of wholesale …rms in country i.
Since nominal wages (measured in terms of the numeraire) are determined exogenously by each country's level of productivity in the homogenous sector, the relevant measure of welfare is the price index in the manufacturing sector weighted by the consumption share of manufacturing goods in the utility function: P i . It turns out that the model generates an expression for the price level of manufacturing goods which is very similar to that found by Chaney (2008) :
and where ij takes the value 1 if i 6 = j and 0 otherwise.
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Two components of this result are especially important. First, the presence of wholesalers in other countries, n W j > 0, lowers the price level in the Home country (country i above) which increases competition there and also raises welfare. Second, an increase in the …xed cost in a model without wholesalers increases the price level. However, when wholesalers are present, the positive e¤ect of an increase in the …xed cost of entry from country j into country i is lower due to the presence of n W j F ji in the denominator. Wholesalers therefore mitigate the e¤ect of …xed costs on price levels. Finally, the variable described in equation (33) is this model's version of the so called 'multilateral resistance' term highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , an ag-gregate index of the remoteness of country i. Chaney (2008) calculates the multilateral resistance variable with his assumptions and …nds:
A comparison of equations (33) and (34) shows that the expressions are virtually identical except for the entry of in the numerator and the e¤ect of wholesale …rms in the denominator. Since n W j > 0, it is therefore the case that the presence of wholesale …rms lowers the price index in all countries and increases both welfare and competition as compared to the standard model in Chaney (2008) . This e¤ect is especially strong in bilateral relationships characterised by high …xed costs of entry. Moreover, it can be seen that the presence of wholesale …rms (higher n W j ) mitigates the e¤ect of a higher …xed cost on the price level.
Proposition 11
The presence of wholesalers in the economies of trading partners lowers a country's price index and increases welfare and competition in this country. Moreover, the presence of wholesalers mitigates the e¤ ect of an increase in the …xed cost on the price index.
Empirical evidence 3.1 Data
The data on trade is based on Swedish …rm data from 2005 (the most recent year for which such data is available) which includes all active …rms in Sweden. A …rm in this dataset is classi…ed according to its main activity, and the analysis will utilise …rms that are listed as 'wholesalers'and …rms active in any of the manufacturing sectors. Only exporting …rms are used and in 2005 there were 7,281 wholesaler …rms exporting and 8,798 manufacturing …rms. 13 The trade data is from Swedish Customs and records all trade ‡ows per …rm, product code (according to the Combined Nomenclature, CN, up to 8 digits) and destination country. For 2005, there are in total 469,437 transactions reported over 8,283 CN8 categories and 194 destination countries. Due to the extreme detail of the CN8 classi…cation, I use the number of CN8 categories exported by a …rm as a proxy for the number of products exported by a …rm. A CN8 category can therefore be seen as a manufacturing variety (or a product, the two are equivalent in the model) in the analysis. CN4 categories (Combined Nomenclature at the four-digit aggregation level) will be used as a control for a more aggregated sector classi…cation. Any reference in the following text to 'sectors'therefore refer to CN4 aggregates.
The average number of CN8 product categories that a …rm exported was 11 for wholesalers and 8 for manufacturers. However, manufacturers were much larger and accounted for 86% of aggregate export volumes (measured in Swedish currency).
As for market size (GDP) and the institutional variables used, all data comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and Doing Business databases. Distance measures are from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for exporting wholesalers and manufacturers.
Main assumption and predictions
This section will assess empirically the main assumption on which the model builds and also the four main hypotheses that it gives. The underlying assumption of the model is that the wholesale technology is characterised by economies of scope, while that of manufacturers is not. This is a somewhat stylised assumption used in order to focus on the dynamics linked to a case in which wholesalers have more economies of scope compared to manufacturers (that wholesalers have a comparative advantage in generating economies of scope in exporting). We already know from a vast literature that manufactures often sell more than one product and that …rms doing so are often very important. However, one way to see whether the assumption of this paper makes sense is to look at whether wholesalers on average sell more products than manufacturers, generally and when controlling for di¤erent characteristics of these …rms such as sector, export destinations and productivity. This is done …rst in the empirical section. The main empirical predictions of the model are:
1. Export sales per good are lower for wholesalers than for producers exporting on their own (Proposition 5).
2. A larger share of aggregate export volumes is handled by wholesalers to countries with high …xed costs of entry (Proposition 9).
3. A larger share of the number of exported goods is handled by wholesalers to countries with high …xed costs of entry (Proposition 9).
4. Producers sort according to productivity when choosing export mode (Proposition 4).
The …rst prediction originates from the fact that goods sold abroad through wholesalers are produced in a less productive way than other export goods and the fact that wholesalers charge an additional markup. The following two predictions, however, are both related to the core mechanism highlighted in the theoretical section: when …xed costs increase, the ability of wholesalers to generate economies of scope by spreading the …xed cost of entry across more goods becomes more valuable. Variation in both variables listed is therefore driven by the variation in …xed costs. Measures of …xed costs of entry are always imperfect but a reasonable proxy would be measures of institutional quality which relate to trade and these are used in the analysis.
Finally, one important prediction remains which I cannot test with the data currently at hand: that manufacturing …rms sort according to productivity as regards export mode (Result 4). Due to the fact that intermediated exporting, as opposed to direct exporting, entails a lower …xed cost but a higher variable cost, it follows that, in a framework as in Melitz (2003) , the most productive …rms will choose to export on their own while …rms with intermediate productivity will choose to export through a wholesaler. Since I cannot observe sales by manufacturers to wholesalers inside Sweden, I do not test the prediction of productivity sorting and export mode. However, early evidence by, for example, Abel (2010) and McCann (2010) , builds on a dataset provided by the World Bank which includes a sample of …rms from several di¤erent developing countries. Interestingly, this data includes mode of export, and both authors …nd robust evidence that the …rms which choose direct exporting are more productive than those which choose indirect exporting.
Economies of scope
As stated, the underlying assumption of the paper is that the wholesale technology is characterised by economies of scope: wholesale …rms are able to distribute more than one product internationally. We know, however, that many manufacturers in reality distribute more than one good but the theoretical section is set up such that the e¤ect of a di¤erence between wholesalers and manufacturers is seen in its simplest form. One way to test this assumption in the data, however, would be to see whether wholesalers, on average, export more products controlling for …rm size, destination and sector e¤ects. I do this by running the following OLS regression:
where Scope isc denotes the number of CN8 product codes exported by …rm i to country c in sector s. W i takes the value 1 if the product is sold by a wholesale …rm and 0 if it is sold by a manufacturer. The variable size i denotes the logarithm of revenues of …rm i and is included since it is well known that larger …rms tend to produce and export a wider scope of products.
To account for characteristics of speci…c product categories and speci…c markets, …xed e¤ects are included for sectors, f s , and destination countries, f c . Otherwise, if wholesalers export within di¤erent categories than manufacturers, or serve di¤erent markets, the coe¢ cient might be biased. Finally, it is quite possible that the errors are correlated within countries. This would yield arti…cially low estimates of the standard errors given that the number of destinations is relatively low (194 countries are included) but the number of observations fairly high (there are 96,273 combinations of …rms and destinations). 14 The standard errors reported here are therefore clustered at the country level.
The coe¢ cient measures how much larger the product scope per country is for wholesalers compared to manufacturers. The assumption used in the paper would correspond to being positive. Table 2 reports the results. It can be seen that estimated di¤erence in scope is positive and signi…cant in all columns, which supports the main assumption used in the theoretical section. When the size of …rms is not included, the di¤erence is not too large and around 10%. But when I take into account that wholesalers are much smaller in size, on average, by including the logarithm of …rms' revenues, the estimated di¤erence is fairly large, around 0.43 (translating into a 56% di¤erence). This is a fairly large number given that the average product scope of …rms is around 10. I therefore conclude that there is an important di¤erence in terms of scope between wholesalers and manufacturing …rms.
Export sales per product
This part examines whether sales per good are lower for wholesalers than manufacturers. The theoretical motivation for this is that wholesalers handle goods that are produced with lower productivity than manufacturers and are therefore more expensive. Moreover, wholesalers need to charge an extra markup which exporting manufacturers do not.
As noted, manufacturers account for 86% of aggregate exports which gives an indication that this prediction holds. However, to account for e¤ects that are speci…c for products and destination countries, a regression analysis using …xed e¤ects for these variables is carried out.
The regression equation is:
where x ipc is the logarithm of the value of exports of product p by …rm i to country c. The coe¢ cient therefore measures the di¤erence in export levels per good between wholesalers and manufacturers. It is possible that the error terms are correlated within countries and the standard errors reported here are therefore clustered at the country level. It is, of course, possible, that the errors are correlated at the product level too but since the product categories are of such detail (there are 8,283 HS8 categories) this is most surely of less worry than any correlation at the country level. Indeed, the standard errors are substantially smaller when they are clustered at the product level instead of the country level. Table 3 lists the result of these regressions. The regressions indicate that wholesalers, on average, sell between 33% and 54% less of a given product to a given country. The negative e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level for all four combinations of …xed e¤ects. The results therefore suggest that the prediction holds: wholesalers sell less per good than producers. The change in magnitude of the estimated di¤erence, when I include …xed e¤ects, is of some magnitude (which means that there is some selection of …rms, especially as regards product categories). This e¤ect, however, is not large and the results are qualitatively similar. The e¤ect of including the size of …rms does not in ‡uence the outcome either.
Importance of wholesalers and …xed costs in destination countries
Regarding predictions 2 to 3, the explanatory variable is the …xed cost of entry in both cases. Therefore, these predictions will be examined in the same context in this section.
The theory states that a higher …xed cost increases the importance of the wholesalers' ability of generating economies of scope. Wholesalers are able to spread the …xed cost across several products and are therefore better equipped to export to markets where the …xed cost is high. They therefore also control a larger share of export volumes and export scope to markets with higher …xed costs of entry. I will use measures of institutions relating to international trade as proxy variables for …xed costs of foreign market entry. These variables have to ful…ll two criteria: (i) they have to be a relevant proxy for …xed costs in international trade, and (ii) they have to be available for a large enough number of countries. This leads to the choice of the following measures from the World Bank: (i) the time required to start a business, (ii) the number of procedures needed to open a warehouse, (iii) the time required to open a warehouse, and (iv) the cost, time and number of documents needed to import. 15 These variables are arguably reasonable proxies for the type of …xed costs present in the model. To see the e¤ect that …xed costs have on the importance of wholesalers, the following regressions are used:
denotes wholesalers' share of aggregate export volumes in sector s (a sector here is a CN4 category) to destination country c,
the share of CN8 products handled by wholesalers in sector s which are exported to country c, Q c the institutional measure for country c (logarithmic values are used), Y c the level of GDP of country c, dist c the distance from Sweden to country c and f s a sector …xed e¤ect. Both GDP and distance are in logarithms as well. Fixed e¤ects are used here to control for technological di¤erences in export mode across sectors. In this and the following section, only product and destination pairs where wholesalers are active are included in the analysis, since this is the situation on which the model focuses.
As regards the error terms, these are likely to be correlated both within countries as well as within sectors. I therefore apply the multiway clustering method as described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (forthcoming) and cluster on both destination and sector. Tables 4a and 4b report the regression result for equations (37) and (38). All the measures of institutional qualities have positive signs in the regression and almost all are significant. 16 If these variables are good proxies of the …xed cost of entering a speci…c market, then the regression results mean that wholesalers are more important, both in quantity and scope, for entering markets characterised by large …xed costs. Distance appears to signi…cantly a¤ect the importance of wholesalers and with a positive sign. As argued before, this is not directly implied by the theoretical model but could still be in line with it. An obvious explanation is that distance not only a¤ects the variable trade cost but also the …xed costs involved in exporting. The …xed cost of entering a foreign market may very well increase with distance since cultural barriers, supervision costs etc. are obviously larger in markets far away than those close to the home country of a …rm.
Regarding the e¤ect of GDP, this is not captured in the theoretical model either. In any case, I do not claim that the theoretical model explains all aspects of intermediated trade, instead it focuses on one dynamic involved and this relates most strongly to …xed costs.
Conclusion
The paper presents a model that gives a rationale for the presence of wholesalers and intermediaries in international trade. Wholesalers possess a technology that allows them to use their international distribution network to handle more than one good (although the …xed cost increases in the number of goods they handle), while the producers of these goods (manufacturing …rms) can only export their own good. In order to cover the …xed cost of exporting, wholesalers charge a markup between the price at which they procure the good and the …nal price that they charge in the foreign country. This markup causes manufacturing …rms to export on their own as long as they are productive enough to cover the …xed cost of doing so. However, if they are not productive enough, they will instead try to sell their good to the foreign market through a wholesaler's distribution network. This process results in productivity sorting in the choice of export mode: the most productive …rms export on their own while less productive …rms export through wholesalers. The least productive …rms do not export at all.
When aggregated, this generates new results for what a¤ects the importance played by wholesalers in international trade, especially for the share of exports as well as the share of products that are shipped through wholesalers'networks. The …xed cost of exporting plays an important role: the higher the …xed cost of exporting, the more important are wholesalers. This is the case since wholesalers can spread the …xed cost over several goods, as opposed to manufacturing …rms, which need to incur one …xed cost for their single good. As …xed costs become more important, …rms shift to exporting through wholesalers (which expand the number of goods they handle) to bene…t from the lower …xed costs per good exported. Wholesalers therefore assist those …rms which are not productive enough to export on their own to do so.
This microeconomic foundation is also used to derive equilibrium price indices in a multicountry framework. It is found that the presence of wholesalers lowers price indices in countries with which they trade. Therefore, wholesalers increase welfare and competition in these countries. Finally, the presence of wholesalers mitigates the e¤ect of …xed costs on price levels.
The empirical section supports the main assumption and predictions of the model. First, Swedish wholesalers export a broader range (56%) of products than manufacturers. Second, wholesalers export smaller amounts of each product, even when the e¤ect of which particular product it concerns or which country the good is exported to is controlled for. Finally, wholesalers are more important, both in quantity and scope, for markets characterised by high …xed costs. The empirical analysis therefore supports the notion that wholesalers play a larger role in exporting to countries characterised by larger …xed costs of entry. Since we know that v 0 decreases in at all possible values of (because v 00 < 0) and approaches zero when ! 1, it must therefore always be strictly positive in the space 2 (1; 1). Therefore, we know that v always increases in . Furthermore, we know that 
A.2 Proof to Proposition 10
Equation (29) can be rewritten as
Then, the total derivative of equation (29) can be formulated as
We know that u ' X ' W is positive from the proof to Proposition 9. Then, 
